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MOTIVE AND RETALIATORY EVICTION
OF TENANTS
Mack A. Player*
I.

INTRODUCTION

RETALIATORY EVICTION occurs when a tenant is evicted because of his lawful attempt to compel his landlord to comply with ,the
law.' At common law, the landlord could evict a tenant for reporting
a housing code violation, walking on the grass, or any other conduct.2
Indeed, the landlord could evict a tenant without any reason at all.
Similarly, if he chose to renew a tenancy, he was free, regardless of
his motive, to raise the rent or alter the terms of the tenancy.3 The
landlord's common law right to deal summarily with his tenants remained virtually intact until the late 1960's.4 Since the landmark decision of Edwards v. Habib,5 however, a growing number of courts" and
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1963, Drury
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1. Comment, Retaliatory Eviction: Review and Reform, 1 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 81, 82 (1971).
2. E.g., Fowel v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1947); DeWolfe v. Roberts, 229 Mass. 410, 412, 118 N.E. 885, 887 (1918); Wornwood v. Alton Bay Camp Meeting Ass'n, 87 N.H. 136, 175 A. 233 (1934). If the tenant held possession under a periodic tenancy, the landlord had to give him "reasonable"
notice prior to eviction.

1 AMERICAN

LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 3.90 (A. Casner ed. 1952).

3. Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 73 A.2d 295 (1950); Bhar Realty Corp. v.
Becker, 49 N.J. Super. 585, 140 A.2d 756 (App. Div. 1958); 62 Spruce St. Realty Co..
v. Murray, 62 Misc. 2d 973, 310 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1970); Russells Factory Stores, Inc. v.
Fielder Furniture Co., 33 Tenn. App. 688, 232 S.W.2d 592 (1950).
4. In the mid-1960's, two California decisions denied the landlord use of the judicial process to evict tenants on the basis of race. Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204
Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962); see Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 415
P.2d 33 (1966). In 1963, Illinois enacted a statute declaring public policy to be against
landlords evicting tenants in retaliation for reporting housing code violations. Law of
July 15, 1963, § 1, [19631 Ill. Laws 1508 (codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71
(1973)). In 1964, an unreported New York decision prohibited an eviction when the
landlord sought retaliation for -the tenant's having reported health code violations. Tarver v. G. & G. Constr. Co., Civil No. 2945 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 9, 1964), summarized in
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Neither the
Illinois statute nor Tarver apparently had much influence on landlord-tenant law.
5. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), noted in 82 HARv. L. REv. 932 (1969).
6. E.g., McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Bowles v. Blue Lake
Dev. Corp., [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. Rwa, T 12, 920, at 12,789 (U.S.
Dist. Ct. S.D. Fla. 1971); Schweiger v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97 (1970);
Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615 (Ch. 1970);
Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968). CL.
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legislatures7 have restricted the landlord's traditional rights by prohibiting retaliatory eviction.
The crucial question in retaliatory eviction cases is whether the
landlord's motive was retaliation. Proof of motive can pose serious
problems for both the tenant and the courts. For instance, since few
actions have a single motive, the courts must resolve the problem of
competing motives. Should the presence of any improper motive render the eviction invalid? Or conversely, should the presence of any
proper motive justify the landlord's action? Such questions are new
to property law, but commonplace in labor law. The 40-year-old National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), for example, forbids discrimination against employees if the employer's purpose is "to encourage or
Similarly, Title
discourage membership in any labor organization,"'
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers, labor unions,
and employment agencies from discriminating against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The judicial doctrines that have developed under these statutes may aid courts struggling with the role of motive in landlord-tenant litigation.
Before discussing motive, however, a brief discussion of the development and current statutes of the doctrine of retaliatory eviction
is necessary."0 In the leading case, Edwards v. Habib," the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia repudiated the common law view
and held that a landlord could not evict a tenant in retaliation for reporting housing code violations. The court reasoned that housing codes
cannot be effectively enforced unless tenants can report violations without fear of being evicted by a vengeful landlord; and suggested that
use of the courts to effect a retaliatory eviction might constitute state
action, and that state action punishing the tenant for complaining to
housing authorities would violate the ,tenant's first amendment rights
to free speech and to petition for redress of grievances.12 The following year, a federal district court in New York adopted these suggestions, thus establishing a constitutional basis for the retaliatory eviction
Wilkins v. Tebbets, 216 S.2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Motoda v. Donohoe, I
Wash. App. 174, 459 P.2d 654 (1969).
7. E.g., D.C. HOUSING REGULATIONS § 2910, reprinted in Indritz, The Tenants'
Rights Movement, 1 N.M.L. REv. 1, 141 (1971); Law of March 25, 1974, § 39, 1974
Neb. Laws Bill No. 293; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (1969). Additional statutes
are cited in notes 25-26 infra. See also UNIFORM RE IDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT
Act § 5.01 [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM AcT]; AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (Tent. Draft 1969) [hereinafter cited
as

MODEL CODE].

8. 29 U.S.C. 'H§ 158(a)(3) (1970) (NLRA).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a to -2(c) (1970) (Title VH).
10. For a general review of retaliatory eviction see Indritz, supra note 7, at 95-101;
Comment, supra note 1.
11. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
12. Id. at 690-98.
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doctrine. The tenant in Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt' had organized
other tenants to remedy housing code violations. The court held that
the landlord's use of the state court ,to evict the -tenantwould constitute
was to retaliate against the -tenstate action if his "overriding purpose"
14

ant for his organizational activity.

In the years since Edwards and Hosey, the basic principle that ten-

ants should be protected from retaliatory eviction has been accepted

in a virtually uninterrupted line of cases and statutes.' 5

Courts and

legislatures have recognized that remedial legislation such as housing
codes can be fully effective only if those the legislation was intended
to protect can communicate freely with enforcement agencies.' 8 Allowing a landlord to retaliate against a tenant for reporting housing
code violations would make other tenants less willing to report violations, thereby hindering enforcement of the code.' 7 Courts and legislatures have also recognized that granting rights to the individual ten-

ant, while allowing the landlord to punish him for exercising those
rights, is fundamentally unfair.'
13. 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
14. Id. at 506. There is some dispute whether use of the state judicial process alone
constitutes state action within the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1940).
Some courts have clearly indicated that it does. E.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687,
690-98 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445,
271 A.2d 615 (Ch. 1970). Others disagree, arguing that the limited state involvement
is neutral and insufficient to trigger constitutional safeguards. Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972); Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217 (Hawaii 1973); Dickhut v.
Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
Courts have generally found state action when there was substantial government entanglement with the landlord, such as financial support, McQueen v. Drcker, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971), or when zoning laws prevented the tenant from finding alternative
housing, Lavoie v. Bigwood, supra. Cf. Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), in which the court found that the landlord had conspired with others
to deprive the tenants of -their first amendment rights. Jurisdiction then lay under 42
Cf. Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971)
U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1970).
(conspiracy theory used to remedy employer discrimination).
15. One court has even held that retaliatory eviction is a tort. Aweeka v. Bonds,
20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 281, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1971).
16. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Most remedial legislation expressly protects those for whose benefit it was enacted. See, e.g., NLRA § 8
(a) (4). In NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized
that a literal interpretation of § 8(a) (4) would not protect the employee, but nonetheless ruled that the policy of the statute prohibited the employee's discharge.
17. There can be no doubt that the slum dweller, even though his home be
marred by housing code violations, will pause long before he complains of them if
he fears eviction as a consequence. Hence an eviction . . . would not only punish
the appellant for making a complaint which she had a. . . right to make . . ., but
also would stand as a warning to others that they dare not be so bold, a result
which, from the authorizing of the housing code, we think Congress affirmatively
sought to avoid.
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Accord, Dickhut v. Norton,
45 Wis. 2d 359, 375-97, 173 N.W.2d 297, 299-301 (1970).
18. Cf. NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the NLRA provides that nothing shall "impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership." Section 8(b) (1 ) (a) gives the union the
HeinOnline -- 1974 U. Ill. L.F. 608 1974
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Although substantial agreement exists that tenants deserve protection, the scope of the protection varies from state to state. In some
states, the doctrine has been given such an expansive meaning that "retaliatory eviction" has become a misnomer. Several courts have prohibited retaliatory rent increases, 19 seven states prohibit all actions
detrimental -to the tenant, including rent increases, reduction in services, and constructive eviction.2 0 In contrast, two states have enacted
statutes that prohibit only the use of 'the state courts to effect retaliatory
eviction, and allow retaliatory rent increases or nonjudicial eviction. 2
These statutes are obviously inadequate, for they give the, landlord
ample opportunity to intimidate his tenants.

Just as there is no agreement on what forms of retaliation to forbid, so too disagreement exists regarding the tenant activities to be protected. Virtually all authorities agree that reporting a housing code
violation is a protected activity.22 The Wisconsin Supreme Court23 and
at least two statutes2 4 add the proviso that the landlord is free -to evict
the tenant if no violation actually exists. Because tenants can seldom
be certain that a housing code violation exists, the Wisconsin doctrine
inhibits complaints to housing authorities. Fortunately, the weight of
authority is that the tenant is protected if he acts incorrectly but in good
faith. 5 Another proviso was added in Toms Point Apartments v.
equivalent of the landlord's traditional right to evict for no reason or any reason. Nevertheless, the Court in Marine Workers held that a union could not exclude a member
because of his exercise of rights given in the NLRA.
19. E.g., Schweiger v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 507, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 476 P.2d 97
(1970); E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544 (App.
Div. 1971).
20. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1942.5(a) (West Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-375a(a) (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.25, § 5516(a) (Supp. 1972), HAWAE REV. STAT. § 521-74(a) (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN.LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 18, ch.
239, § 2A (Supp. 1973) (prohibits all reprisals); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03(2)(3)
(Supp. 1974); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 8590(2)(5) (McKinney 1974); accord, UNiFORM ACT § 5.101(a); MODEL CODE § 2-407(1).
21. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 6001 (Supp. 1973); MrCH. STAT. ANN.
§ 600.5720 (Supp. 1973).
22. Courts have also protected tenants who complained that the landlord had violated general health, safety, or zoning statutes not specifically designed to benefit tenants. See Bowles v. Blue Lake Dev. Corp., [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov.
L. RpeR. 12,920, at 12,789 (U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D. Fla. 1971); Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615 (Ch. 1970).
23. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970), noted in 1971
Wis. L. REv. 939, 947.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516(c)(6) (Supp. 1972); HAWAfl REV. STAT.
§ 521-74(b)(6) (Supp. 1973); accord, MODEL CODE § 2-407(2)(f).
25. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19-375a(a)(1), (3) (Supp. 1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1973);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1974). The Uniform Act imposes no good
faith requirement. See UNiFORM Acr § 5.101 (a). Contra, MODEL CODE § 2-407.
Aside from Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970), virtually
none of the cases seek to ascertain whether housing code violations actually existed.
See, e.g., Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d
687, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Goudzward28 by a New York court which denied relief to a tenant because the landlord repaired the premises before seeking to evict him.
Permitting a landlord to evict a tenant once repairs are made destroys
all incentive to report violations, because the tenant can not benefit
from the improved housing conditions. Fortunately, like the Wisconsin
doctrine, Toms Point has remained an aberration. Several jurisdictions

protect a broad range of tenant activities besides complaints to housing authorities. Typical protected activities include tenant meetings to
discuss common problems,27 formation of tenant associations,28 complaints to the landlord, 29 litigation against the landlord,

rent withholding."'

°

and lawful

Safeguarding tenant meetings and organizational

activity seems especially justified, because otherwise the landlord could

forestall tenant revolts by acting prior to the lodging of formal complaints.

Statutes in at least four states, however, protect only the ten-

ant's right to report housing code violations.8 2 In interpreting one of

these statutes, the Hawaii Supreme Court has ruled that a landlord is
free to retaliate for a tenant's organizational aotivities. s8
Of course, not all tenant activities should be protected. A tenant
26. 72 Misc. 2d 629, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1972).
27. E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544 (App.
Div. 1971); Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 Misc. 2d 629, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1972).
28. McQueen v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir. 1971); Alexander Hamilton Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 N.J. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7 (Dist. Ct. 1969). Several
state statutes specify that organizational activity is protected. E.g., ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. Lows ANN. ch. 186, § 18, ch. 239,
§ 2A (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10-.12 (Supp. 1974); accord, UNIFORM AcT § 5.101(a)(3).
29. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (organizing
to complain); Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615
(Ch. 1970).
30. McQueen v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); F.W. Bums Sales Co. v.
McKinney, 41 U.S.L.W. 2303 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1972). In Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 114, 312 A.2d 888 (1973), the court held
that the tenant had a protected right to campaign in an election for a candidate and
platform diametrically opposed to the landlord's position.
31. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Schweiger
v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 507, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 476 P.2d 97 (1970) (statute allowed
rent withholding); Brown v. Southall Realty, 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); Alexander Hamilton Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 NJ. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7 (Dist.
CL 1969).
32. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19375a (Supp. 1974); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 521-74 (Supp. 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80,
§ 71 (1973); accord, MODEL CODE § 2-407. One commentator has suggested these statutes do not preclude courts from imposing broader protection. 22 HAsTrIGs L.J. 1365
(1971).
Contra, Comment, Retaliatory Eviction in California: The Legislature Slams
the Door and Boards Up the Windows, 46 S. CAL. L REv. 118 (1972). In NLRB v.
Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972), the Court prohibited retaliation against employees who
had aided a National Labor Relations Board investigation, although the NLRA by its
terms protected only those who filed charges or testified at a hearing.
33. Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217 (Hawaii 1973). The court rejected all first
amendment arguments, suggesting the tenant remains free to speak and to carry on organizational activity.
HeinOnline -- 1974 U. Ill. L.F. 610 1974
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who causes the code violation of which he complains is clearly not entitled to protection from eviction. 4 Fundamental fairness does not require that the tenant be protected from the natural consequences of
his own wrongdoing. Similarly, the landlord should
not be forced to
5
tolerate groundless complaints made in bad faith.3
Retaliatory eviction has at least two elements in every jurisdiction:
the tenant's exercise of a protected right and an action taken by the
landlord detrimental to the tenant. Since -the landlord is free ,to act

for any legitimate reason or even without any reason, 36 the tenant in

the vast majority of jurisdictions must also demonstrate that the landlord's motive was improper.17 Some statutes require direct proof of
the landlord's motive regardless of the length of time between his action and the tenant's exercise of a protected right.3 " Under these statutes, the tenant never enjoys a presumption of improper motive.
Other statutes aid the tenant by creating a rebuttable presumption of
illegal motive if -the landlord acts within a given period following the
protected activity.3 9 Except in one state,40 if the landlord acts after
this period ends, the tenant may still prove improper motive without
the aid of the presumption.4
A different approach is taken by a Connecticut statute and the
34. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a(b)(3) (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 5516(c)(5) (Supp. 1972); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 subd. 4 (Supp.
1973); LaChance v. Hoyt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207, 269 A.2d 303, 305 (1969); PMS Realty
Co. v. Guarino, 126 N.J. Super. 134, 312 A.2d 898 (Dist. Ct. 1973).
35. Retaliatory eviction statutes generally require a good faith complaint. By implication, they would not protect bad faith complaints. But see UNIFORM ACT § 5.101
(a); cf. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969) (under
title VII, even malicious complaints by employees concerning employment practices are
privileged); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963) (unions cannot discipline members for even malicious statements). For a criticism of the "absolutist" approach in labor law cases see Beaird & 'Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin
Act, 25 ALA. L. REv. 577, 591-93 (1973).
36. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dickhut v. Norton,
45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301-02 (1970).
37. Courts that have created the defense of retaliatory eviction uniformly require
proof of motive. E.g. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302
(1970); see Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
38. See ILL. 'REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1973); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8590
(McKinney 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (1969).
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(a)(d) (West Supp. 1973) (60 days); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 5516 (Supp. 1972) (90 days); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001
(Supp. 1973) (6 months); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 186, § 18, ch. 239, § 2A (Supp.
1973) (6 months); MICH. CoMp. LAws. ANN. § 600.5720(2) (Supp. 1973) (90 days):
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 subd. 2(2) (Supp. 1974) (90 days); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.13-b (Supp. 1973) (3 months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.12(d) (Supp. 1973)
(no time limit); accord, UNIFORM ACT § 5.101(b) (1 year).
40. The California statute apparently precludes court consideration of the defense
of retaliation if more than 60 days lapses between the tenant's activity and the landlord's action. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(a) (West Supp. 1973).
41. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5720(2) (Supp. 1973). The Michigan
statute creates a rebuttable presumption of nonretaliation if more 'than 90 days elapse
between the tenant's activity and the landlord's action.
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American Bar Foundation's Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code,
which provide with some exceptions that the landlord cannot evict or
raise the rent for a set time after the tenant engages in a protected
activity. After this time expires, he is free to retaliate against the -tenant. 42 Although the Model Code relieves the tenant of the burden of
proving motive, it does not serve the policy underlying the doctrine of
retaliatory eviction because it leaves the landlord sufficient leverage to
intimidate tenants into remaining silent about housing code violations.4 3
The draftsmen of -the Model Code justified their mechanical approach to -the problem of retaliatory eviction by suggesting that most
tenants would be unable to prove that the landlord had a retaliatory
motive.4 4 The Edwards court also recognized that establishing motive
might prove difficult, but observed that the same problem exists under
the NLRA. 45 Proof of motive is also essential in actions arising under
title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis
of race or sex. Like the tenant, the employee has the burden of proving the presence of improper motive. 46 Since employers, like landlords, are rarely foolish enough to express their discriminatory motives,4 7 the problem of proof facing the employee is virtually the same
as -that facing the -tenant. As the Edwards court implied, if the problem of proving motive can be solved in labor law, it can also be solved
in landlord-tenant law.
II.

PROOF OF MOTIVE UNDER TITLE VII AND TiE

NLRA

The employee need not introduce direct evidence of the employer's motive.4" Instead, with the help of a complicated system of
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a(a) (Supp. 1974) (6 months); MODEL CODE
§ 2-407(1) (6 months). See MODEL CODE § 2-407, Comment (1), Commentary.
43. The draftsmen admitted the numerous exceptions included in § 2-407 undermined its basic policy. Moreover, the time period fixed by the Code, 6 months, is far
too short.
44. MODEL CODE § 2-407, Commentary. They also noted that at the time they
drafted the code no penalties attached to the finding of retaliatory eviction. The draftsmen consequently provided for recovery of triple damages or 3-months rent by a successful tenant. § 2-407(3); accord, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516(d) (Supp. 1972).
45. 397 F.2d at 703. In the absence of legislation, the employer historically could
establish the terms and conditions of employment, and hire and fire at will. Pearson
v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964). Some courts have
placed public policy limits on an employer's rights. See Peterman v. Teamsters Local
396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employer sought to fire employee in
retaliation for his refusal to perjure himself). See generally Blades, Employment at Will
vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
46. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); NLRB v. Shen
Valley Packing Co., 211 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1954); Indiana Metal Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953).
47. Even early in the NLRA's history, most employers did not openly acknowledge
anti-union motivation. 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 71-72 (1937).
48. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954).
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evidentiary presumptions, he can establish the employer's intent by introducing evidence of -the employer's conduct, -the context in which it
occurred, and its consequences. The cases are perhaps best grouped
into two categories: single-employee discrimination cases, in which the
employer singles out one employee for special -treatment such as discharge, transfer, demotion, or discipline; and group-discrimination
cases, in which an employer adopts and uniformly applies a policy covering a large number of employees, such as a minimal test requirement,
lockout, or salary adjustment. The courts' approach to proving motive
depends on the category to which the alleged discrimination belongs.
In single-employee cases under title VII, the Supreme Court has
held that when a plaintiff proves that he is a member of a class protected by the Act, that he has applied for a job he is ostensibly qualified
-to hold, that he was rejected or discharged, and that the position remained open to other applicants, he has established a prima facie case
of illegal discriminatory motive.49 In other words, he has produced
sufficient objective evidence -to raise a presumption that the employer's
motive was discriminatory. Although the ultimate burden of persuasion never leaves -the plaintiff, the burden of going forward shifts
to the employer. 50 If the employer fails to rebut the plaintiff's prima
facie case, the plaintiff will be deemed -to have carried his burden of
proof.
A similar analysis is used in cases arising under the NLRA. In
single-employee discrimination cases, proof that the employer disciplined or discharged an employee soon after learning that he was engaged in a protected activity establishes a prima facie case of illegal
discrimination. 5 ' In group discrimination cases, when an employer's
policy disproportionately harms those who have engaged in protected
activities, the factfinder may infer -that the employer's motive was discriminatory. And, as in single-employee discrimination,5 2 the factfinder need not accept the employer's unsupported claim of innocence.
The employer must come forward with evidence of a valid business jus49. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 820 (1973). See also Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
50. For a general discussion of presumptions and-burdens of proof see C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE

635-76 (1954); J.

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

439-67 (student ed.

1935).
51. See, e.g., NLRB v. Treasure Lake, Inc., 194 F.2d 56 (1st Cir. 1952); Holly
Farms Poultry Indus., 194 N.L.R.B. 952 (1972); Metallic Bldg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 386
(1952). Of course, additional evidence of anti-union animus or other unfair labor practices strengthens this presumption. See, e.g. NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d
45 (9th Cir. 1970); Cab Serv. Parts Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 84 L.R.R.M. 1588
(1973).
52. In NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 409 (1962), the Court stated that
"the denial of one who has a motive to deny may be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, annoyance or defiance as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and, if he
is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies." Cf. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-48 (1954).
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tification for his policy.53 If he fails, the factfinder must find improper
motivation.
Thus, if -the employer fails to counter the employee's prima facie
case, he will generally lose, whether the case involves single-employee
or group discrimination. If -the employer does produce additional evidence, however, the -type of discrimination becomes important, and
whether the case arises under title VII or the NLRA also becomes important. McDonnell Douglas v. Green,54 a single-employee discrimination case arising under title VII, indicates that a bare prima facie
case, when rebutted by strong employer evidence of proper motivation,
cannot sustain the employee's claim. The Green Court noted, however, that additional circumstantial evidence, such as a history of discrimination or statistical evidence of discrimination, could provide further
proof of the employer's motive. If the plaintiff produces this additional
evidence, then the facifinder must weigh the evidence produced by
both parties. Single-employee cases under the NLRA do not appear
to go as far as Green in requiring the plaintiff to parry evidence of
business justification. Apparently, proof of a discriminatory act closely
following an employee's protected activity is sufficient to support a
finding for the employee, even -if the employer has advanced plausible
business reasons for his action. The employee need not introduce additional evidence to support his prima facie case.
The Supreme Court has approached the problem of proving motive in group-discrimination cases differently, by establishing a class of
cases in which the employer's actual motive is virtually irrelevant. In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,5" which arose under title VII, an employer
utilized standardized tests to screen job applicants. A disproportionate
percentage of blacks failed the -tests. The lower court found, however,
that the employer had adopted the tests in good faith for the purpose
of upgrading the quality of the work force. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court held that if the tests had a racially discriminatory impact, the employer had to establish a "business necessity" for their use.56 Use of
53. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); U.S. v. Georgia
Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
54. 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
55. 401 U.S. 424 (1973).
56. Id. at 436. It was not entirely clear whether the Court was ruling that motive
was not an element or whether improper motive would be conclusively presumed unless
the employer had business justification for conduct that discriminated against a particular race. Given the language of § 703(a) (1), which prohibits discrimination "because
of such individual's race," proof of motive would seem necessary. Similarly, § 703(a)
of the Act allows an employer "to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test . . . is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The terms "designed,
intended or used" seem to indicate that the statute requires proof of an improper mofive. Hence, Griggs probably should be read to mean that an employer's action having
a discriminatory impact creates a presumption of improper motive that can not be rebutted without proof of business necessity.
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the tests without substantial business justification, the Court indicated,
would violate title VII. Some group-discrimination cases arising under
the NLRA follow a somewhat similar analysis. The Court has ruled
that certain employment practices are "inherently destructive" of protected employee rights.5 7 Unless -the employer demonstrates a business justification for an "inherently destructive" practice, the employee's
complaint will be sustained as a matter of law. Even if the employer
does demonstrate a business justification, the factfinder may balance the
business justification against the employee's interest and conclude, even
in the absence of direct evidence of improper motive, that the employer
has violated the NLRA.
Not all employer policies detrimental to employee rights, however,
are inherently destructive. But even those considered to have comparatively slight impact create a presumption of improper motive. Unless
the employer produces evidence of a proper motive for adopting the
policy, the employee is vindicated as a matter of law. Actions that
have comparatively slight impact carry much weaker inferences of discriminatory motive, however, than do inherently destructive practices.
If -the employer demonstrates a business justification for a practice with
comparatively slight impact, the employee cannot safely rely on his
prima facie case of discrimination for the Court has said that "the fact
finder must [then] find from evidence independent of the mere conduct
involved that the conduct was primarily motivated by an anti-union
animus.""'
The initial determination that an employer's action has an inherently destructive or comparatively slight impact is crucial, since it controls whether the employee must counter evidence of business justification. The "inherently destructive-comparatively slight" dichotomy is
apparently a response to the unique wording of the NLRA, which requires both interference with a protected right and an intent to interfere with union activities. When single-employee discrimination follows union activity, -the employer's intent can be directly inferred from
his acts. But a two-step inference is needed when an employer adopts
a general policy of uniform application. First, the inference must be
drawn that the policy interferes with a protected right. Then, the factfinder must infer from this interference that the employer intended to
affect union activities. Labeling an action as -inherently destructive
facilitates the inference that it was designed to discourage membership
in a labor organization, whereas -the "comparatively slight" 'label enables the factfinder to uphold the employer when interference is minimal and economic justification exists.59
57. See, e.g., N.LRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
58. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 285, 274-76 (1965); accord, Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1960).
59. In one type of group-disc imiaatiop case, however, the "inherently destructiveHeinOnline -- 1974 U. Ill. L.F. 615 1974
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The benefit to be gained by transplanting the "inherently destructive" and "comparatively slight" concepts to landlord-tenant law seems
slight. Only one rather unsuccessful attempt has been made to use
these labor law doctrines in a landlord-tenant case.6" The labor cases
clearly demonstrate, however, the utility of presumptions in litigation
involving proof of motivation. The labor law experience can provide
invaluable guidance in developing a system of presumption for landlord-tenant law.
III.

A SUGGESTION
A.

PROOF OF MOTIVE:
FOR LANDLORD-TENANT CASES

The Tenant's Prima FacieCase

Under present law, the tenant must carry the ultimate burden of
persuasion; that is, he must prove that the landlord had an improper
motive. Presumptions of improper motive can help him carry this
burden. To create a presumption of improper motive, the tenant must
establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Proof that the tenant engaged in activity protected by law, that the 'lessor had knowledge of
his activity, 6' and that within a relevant time6 2 the lessor acted to the
tenant's detriment should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
comparatively slight" analysis has no application. In Textile Workers v. Darlington
Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the Supreme Court indicated that the closing of an entire
business, even though discriminatorily motivated, did not violate the NLRA. Since the
NLRA regulates only the employer-employee relationship, it has no effect when that relationship ceases upon the worker's discharge. If the employer closes only part of his
business, however, a violation of the NLRA can be found if the employer acts to chill
unionism elsewhere in his enterprise. The parties whose rights are violated are not the
discharged employees but the workers at the remaining plants. To prove discrimination,
however, they must demonstrate not only that the closing chilled protected activities elsewhere in the business, but also that the employer foresaw the result of his action.
60. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For
criticism of the court's misuse of labor law analogies see note 86 infra.
61. A complaint, letter, or personal confrontation would establish the lessor's
knowledge. As in labor cases, knowledge of the tenant's activity could also be established by inference. See NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 86 (7th Cir. 1971). Activity that is open and notorious, well publicized, or easily observable by the landlord
is presumed to be within his knowledge.
Whether the tenant actually engaged in a protected activity may be irrelevant if the
landlord acts in the belief that he did. Although the retaliatory eviction statutes by
their terms protect only the tenant who actually complains, e.g. CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 1942.5 (Supp. 1974); UNIFORM AcT § 5.101(a), it seems unfair to permit the eviction
of a tenant who has not in fact acted. Faced with a similar problem the NLRB has
held that an employer who discharges an employee on the mistaken belief that he had
engaged in protected activity is guilty of an unfair labor practice. San Juan Lumber
Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 108 (1963).
62. In neither labor law nor landlord-tenant law have courts established definite
time limits for operation of a presumption. A number of statutes, however, do establish
a time frame within which the presumption of discrimination operates. See note 36 supra. This approach has the benefit of predictability and ease of operation, but operates
almost as an invitation to the landlord who desires to retaliate. He may simply wait
until the applicable period has passed and then safely evict the tenant.
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On the other hand, if the lessor increases rent, reduces services, or
evicts the tenant before the tenant engages in protected activity or before the lessor learns of the protected activity, no inference of improper
motive would arise.65
B.

Methods of Rebutting the Presumptionof ImproperMotive

Once the tenant has established a prima facie case of retaliation,
the lessor has -the burden of producing evidence of proper motivation.
The amount of evidence the landlord must present -to avoid a directed
verdict for the tenant is unclear. The minimum amount of evidence
he can present is a plea of innocence, unsupported by any objective
facts. The labor cases provide little guidance as to whether an unsupported plea of innocence is sufficient to avoid a directed verdict. Cases
arising under the NLRA indicate that, if believed, a plea of innocence4
is sufficient to overcome a prima facie case of improper motivation,
whereas Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,65 which arose under title VII, indicates that evidence of subjective good faith, standing alone, is entitled
to no weight.
Whether as a matter of law the landlord must have objective
"business justifications" for his eviction may 'have little practical importance. When faced with a tenant who was evicted shortly after exercising a protected right, the factfinder will naturally expect some justification by the lessor, and will not be disposed to believe that the lessor
acted on an illogical whim. Thus, lack of objective corroboration will
doom most landlords to an adverse judgment like that faced by employers unable to present justification for discharging known union activists.
Nevertheless, the lessor's unsupported claim of innocence should be
sufficient ,to avoid a directed verdict.
The law of retaliatory eviction, like that of discriminatory discharge, provides that a tenant can be evicted for any legitimate reason,
or for no reason at all. A landlord who evicts a tenant for no reason
at all has only his own testimony to rebut a -tenant's prima facie case.
Requiring him to present objective evidence to avoid a directed verdict
would in effect destroy a rule of substantive law.
Whether necessary as a matter of law, or only as a practical matter, business justification is critical in refuting a tenant's prima facie
showing of discrimination.6 6 Business justifications that would rebut
63. See MODEL CODE § 2-407(2)(h); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a(b)(4)
(Supp. 1974); HAwAn REV. STAT. § 521.74(b)(8) (Supp. 1973).
64. See NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962).
65. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
66. Many retaliatory eviction statutes specifically list the defenses that a landlord
may assert. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-375a(b)(c) (Supp. 1974); DEL.
CODE ANN.tit. 25, §§ 5516(c), (e) (Supp. 1972); HAWAI REV. STAT. §§ 521-74(b), (d)
(Supp. 1973); MODEL CODE §§ 2-407(2), (4); UNIFORM ACT § 501(c). Most statutes,
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a presumption of retaliatory motive fall into three categories: tenant
misconduct, economic motivation, and physical necessity. Physical
necessity is present when a repair requires that the apartment be unoccupied.

Misconduct is perhaps the most obvious justification for evicting
a tenant.

Retaliatory eviction statutes generally provide that damage

by the tenant will justify either eviction or a rent increase to cover the

cost of repair. 67 Making groundless complaints -to the authorities is an-

other form of misconduct justifying eviction. A landlord need not tolerate malicious harassment by tenants. To protect the tenant who
makes a good faith but erroneous complaint, the courts should require
the landlord to establish that the tenant knew the complaint to be false,

or made it with conscious disregard of its truth or falsity."" Moreover,
,tenant misconduct, like employee misconduct, cannot be used as a pre-

text to retaliate for protected activity. 69

Tenant misconduct is simply

evidence that the landlord's motive was not retaliation; no amount of
misconduct will excuse a retaliatory eviction. If the landlord has condoned similar tenant misconduct in the past,70 if he applies a rule unequally to other tenants,71 or if he vacillates in giving reasons for the
eviction, 72 the inference is that the landlord acted not because of the
tenant's misconduct, but out of a desire to retaliate.
Economic motivation is the second -type of justification that can
be used to rebut a prima facie showing of retaliation.7 3 Increased
however, do not address this issue. E.g., MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp.
1974); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 600.5770 (Supp. 1974); MIrNN. STAT. ANN. § 556.03 (Supp.
1974).
67. See statutes collected in note 66 supra; accord, LaChance v. Hoyt, 6 Conn. Cir.
207, 269 A.2d 303, 305 (1969).
68. A landlord's honest but mistaken belief that the tenant had caused the damage
would negate a prima facie showing of retaliatory motive. Of course, the factfinder
would probably not accept a defense of honest mistake unless the landlord could present
strong evidence to establish the reasonableness of his erroneous belief.
Superficially, NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), in which the
Court reinstated union organizers who had been discharged on the erroneous, good faith
belief that they had threatened physical violence, is authority against allowing the landlord the defense of mistake. The Court in Burnup, however, relied on a section of the
NLRA in which intent is irrelevant. It did not controvert the lower court's conclusion
that an honest mistake would justify discharge if improper motive were an element of
the offense. Since an improper motive is necessary to find a retaliatory eviction, an
honest mistake would provide a defense to a charge of retaliation.
69. See Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1943).
70. Id.; cf. Alexander Hamilton Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 N.J. Super. 89,
257 A.2d 7 (Dist. Ct. 1969).
71. See PMS Realty Co. v. Guarino, 126 N.J. Super. 134, 139; 312 A.2d 898, 900
(Dist. Ct. 1973); cf. NLRB v. Solo Cup Corp., 237 F.2d 524-25 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB
v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 162 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1947).
72. See Riley v. Willette, [1968-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. RPT.
12,263, at 12,516 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1970).
73. Nonpayment of rent is the most obvious economic justification for eviction.
See UNIFORM AcT § 5.101(c)(2). Of course, a simple failure to pay rent should be
distinguished from rent withholding to force the landlord to bring the premises into cornHeinOnline -- 1974 U. Ill. L.F. 618 1974
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taxes, costs, and capital improvements can justify a rent increase. An
undue delay between increased costs and a rent increase, however, may
establish the pretextual nature of the increase, particularly if the rent
is increased soon after tenant's protected activity. 74 A rent increase
may also be considered retaliatory if it exceeds the increase in the landlord's costs or if the increase is not distributed evenly among all ten75
ants.
Whether the cost of bringing a building into compliance with
housing codes justifies a rent increase presents a difficult policy question.76 Tenants may be unwilling to complain if they must bear the
cost of repair. On the other hand, a landlord may be financially unable
to absorb the cost of repair, especially if he has charged low rent for
the deficient premises. 7 Furthermore, once he repairs the premises,
the landlord will have to increase his maintenance expenditures to prevent deterioration. He cannot be expected to operate at a loss. 78 Although requiring those who benefit from repairs to shoulder at least
part of the cost is not unfair, the complaining tenant in an apartment
complex should not have to bear -the entire cost alone. The cost should
be spread evenly to all tenants in the complex. Furthermore, the lessor cannot recoup the costs in a short period. Rather, he must amortize
them over the effective life of -the improvement, thus minimizing adverse impact on the tenant. Singling out a small group of tenants to
bear the entire cost, or attempting to recover the total costs in a short
period should be considered indicative of a desire to retaliate.
Another economic justification for a rent increase is the simple
desire to raise profits, a legitimate motive in a capitalist society. As
pliance with housing codes. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
74. The statutes that specify landlord defenses to a charge of retaliatory eviction
uniformly permit the lessor to pass on increased costs, provided they were incurred
within 4 months of the rent increase. See state statutes collected in note 66 supra; but
see UNIFORM ACT §§ 5.101(a)(c).
75. See MODEL CODE§ 2-407(4) (b).
76. The Model Code and Uniform Act apparently preclude passing on this cost.
MODEL CODE § 2-407(4)(b); UNIFORM ACr § 5.101(c).
77. Tenants may be willing to accept unsafe or unsanitary conditions in return for
reduced rent. Nonetheless, permitting such conditions controverts the basic policy of
most housing codes. Increasingly, courts are recognizing that lessors have an implied
obligation to rent only fit premises. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237
A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969).
78. As a possible solution, the landlord might be required to prove his financial inability to absorb the cost of repair and maintenance. Cf. Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp., 463 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1972). That approach, however, creates a host of problems: Should financial inability be the same for a corporate landlord which may have
income from other apartment complexes or even other enterprises as for, say, a retired
pensioner dependent upon income from perhaps only one building? Does "financial inability" occur only when red ink appears on the balance sheet? Or when the pensioner's
profit is so low that he has to reduce his standard of living? What should be his standard of living?
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a practical matter, however, the landlord may have difficulty convincing
the factfinder that he desired only to increase his profit, not to punish a
tenant, especially if the rent increase followed closely on the heels of
a protected tenant activity. The factfinder is even less likely to believe
him if the rent increase was excessive or discriminatory.
Ironically, the tenant who succeeds in forcing -the landlord to undertake repairs may find the landlord arguing ,that he has to evict the
tenant to do the necessary work. Such evictions are justified only if
they are a physical necessity. Evidence that the repairs were not extensive or could have been accomplished in a short time would tend
to disprove the landlord's claimed justification.7 9 Even a finding of
physical necessity, however, does not necessarily justify severing all relations with -thetenant. In labor law, an employer may lay off or discharge an unneeded employee. But if the employee has engaged in
protected activity, and if other work he is capable of performing is available within the plant, the employer's failure to retain him raises a permissible inference of unlawful discrimination. 0 Similarly, an employer's refusal to rehire strikers creates an inference of improper
motive. 8 ' By analogy, the landlord's failure to offer an available unit
to the tenant, and his refusal to give the tenant first option to rent the
repaired premises, would tend to prove that the landlord had a retaliatory motive, even if eviction were absolutely necessary to repair the
unit.82 Permitting severance would discourage tenants from complaining of major housing deficiencies. With no benefit to be gained, .the
tenant would have no reason to complain. Thus, enforcement of the
housing code would be hindered, defeating the policy underlying the
doctrine of retaliatory eviction.
Under some circumstances, however, the landlord need not offer
the tenant other housing when repair work necessitates the tenant's
eviction. For example, evidence that repair of ,the .tenant's unit was
part of a general plan undertaken before the tenant acted would tend
to prove that the landlord lacked a retaliatory motive.
So far, two ways that 'the landlord can rebut a presumption of retaliation have been considered: he can show that he acted on a whim
79.

In Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc. 2d 384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Binghamton City

Ct. 1973), the court noted that the required heating unit could have been installed in

less than 2 weeks, with minimum disruption to the tenant. The court rejected the
claimed necessity of eviction, finding a retaliatory motive. Id. at 389, 342 N.Y.S.2d at
280.
80. Ridgely Mfg. Co., 207 N.L.R.B. No. 17, at 14 (1973); Cubit Sys. Corp., 194
N.L.R.B. 622, 623 (1971); Morgan Furniture Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 944, 972 (1953).
81. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171
N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369 (1968).

82.

The text treats this issue as an evidentiary matter, but obviously the solution

offered verges on the creation of a new substantive right.

Arguably, refusal to rent

other premises to a tenant because he had engaged in protected activities is equivalent
to the "blacklist" of union organizers long outlawed in labor law. See NLRB v. Waubee
Mills, Inc., 114 F.2d 226, 232 (1st Cir. 1940).
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or that he had a valid business justification. A different form of rebuttal was offered in Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.,8 3 in which
the landlord claimed that he intended to remove 'the unit from the
rental market altogether. He had tried for more than 4 years to oust
the tenant, who was justifiably withholding rent because -the unit violated the housing code. The landlord sought to recover possession because he was unwilling to make the necessary repairs. He argued that
he had the right not to have any tenants at all in the unit.
Had the landlord lived in a state following the Model Code approach, he might have succeeded. The Model Code prohibits the
landlord from evicting a -tenant within 6 months after the tenant engages in a protected activity," 4 unless the landlord seeks in good faith
to remove the unit from the market for at least 6 months.8" The
phrase "in good faith" is ambiguous. It could mean -that the landlord's motive must not be retaliation. But since -the draftsmen were
critical of statutes requiring proof of motive in retaliatory eviction cases,
"good faith" probably means only that the landlord must honestly intend to keep the premises off the market. Under this definition of
"good faith," a landlord can retaliate against a tenant with impunity,
provided he keeps the premises off -the market. If the tenant were
withholding rent, as in Robinson, -thelandlord would lose nothing.
The Robinson Court rejected the landlord's argument and held
that unless he was going out of business altogether, he did not have
an absolute right to withdraw a unit from rental use. Instead, evidence
of the landlord's desire to contract his business must be weighed against
the presumption of retaliation. The court ruled that to rebut the presumption, the landlord must show that he was unable, not simply unwilling, to repair the unit.8 6 Thus, in at least one jurisdiction, even
83.

84.

463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

MODEL CODE § 2-407. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516 (Supp. 1972), and
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521.74 (Supp. 1973), are patterned on the Model Code but place

no time limit on the prohibition.
85. MODEL CODE § 2-407(2)(d). Section 2-417(2) contains other exceptions to
the 6-months requirement. The Model Code also permits the landlord to recover possession if he seeks in good faith to occupy the premises as his own abode. Id. § 2-407(2)
(b). The discussion in the text of § 2-407(2) (d) is equally applicable to § 2-407(2)(b).
86.' Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 866-69 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The court relied heavily on Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965), in which an employer, acting from an anti-union animus, closed one plant while
continuing to operate elsewhere. Assuming the row house Mrs. Robinson rented was
one of a large number the landlord owned at the same site, the courts' analogy was inapposite; for the eviction was really analogous to closing a portion of a single plant. If
the house was the only one the landlord owned at that location, the court simply misapplied Darlington. If removing her house from the market was the equivalent of closing
an entire plant, Darlington teaches that only the other tenants, not Mrs. Robinson, had
the right to contest her eviction. See note 59 supra. Had the court correctly applied
Darlington, it would have remanded for a determination of whether the landlord intended to interfere with the rights of the other tenants, and whether eviction had the
forseeable impact of accomplishing that intention. Instead, the court remanded to per-
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if -the landlord removes the unit from the rental market after evicting
the tenant, ,the doctrine of retaliatory eviction applies.
C.

The Effect of Rebuttal Evidence on the Tenant's
PrimaFacie Case

If the landlord produces objective evidence to justify a challenged
action, should he be entitled to a directed verdict if the tenant presents
no evidence beyond his prima facie case? Or should the factfinder
consider ,the landlord's unrebutted evidence as probative, but not controlling? Neither labor law, evidence law, nor the Uniform Act provides a clear answer. In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 7 which arose
under title VII, the Court held that an employee must rebut objective
evidence of business justification. The rule is the same under the
NLRA when the presumption of discrimination arises from an action
that has a "comparatively slight" impact on protected rights. s8 On -the
other hand, if ,the presumption arises from an action "inherently destructive" of employees' rights, the employees need not rebut evidence
of business justification. To obtain any guidance from the labor cases,
the courts would first have ,to adopt the awkward analytical framework
of the labor cases. The rules of evidence pertaining to presumption
provide no more guidance. One school of thought insists that a presumption is merely a device for allocating the presentation of evidence
and disappears once contrary evidence is introduced; a second school
insists that if the presumption has -an evidentiary basis, ,the factfinder
may rely on it even in the face of contrary evidence.8 9 Section 5.101
(b) of the Uniform Act says that when a presumption arises "the trier
of fact must find the existence of 'the fact presumed unless and until
evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its non-existence." The Act says nothing, however, about what happens to the presumption once counterevidence is introduced.
Although the courts have not directly addressed the issue, they
seem unwilling to allow the mere introduction of bona fide business
mit the factfinder to determine whether the landlord was retaliating against Mrs. Robinson.

To be sure, the court said that the landlord should not be permitted to close a

unit to intimidate remaining tenants, 463 F.2d 860, 867, but the court did not direct
the production of any evidence of an intent to intimidate other tenants.
To say that the Robinson court misapplied Darlington is not to say that it reached
the wrong result. It is to suggest that Darlington is of doubtful merit, because the court

permitted an employer who remained in business to punish employees for exercising
their rights.

87.
88.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailer, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 35 (1967)

(Harlan, I.,

dissenting); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 285 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).

89. O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 212 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1954); Annot.,
5 A.L.R.3d 19 (1966); UNIFoRM RULES OF EVIENCE 14 (1953); U.S. DIST. CTs. RULES
OF EVIDENCE 3-03.
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reasons -to destroy the tenant's prima facie case. The court in Robinson, for example, went to great lengths to emphasize the factual nature
of the competing inferences, and labelled the eviction "inherently destructive" to ensure that the jury would be allowed to resolve these inferences. Other courts have ruled in favor of the tenant even though
economic justifications for the eviction were offered. 0
Requiring the tenant to rebut the landlord's proof of objective
business justification may be asking the impossible. Unlike the employer, who may provide employees with additional evidence by revealing an anti-union bias in the course of an organizational campaign, a
landlord seldom has occasion to make public, antitenant comments.
Unlike the plaintiff in a -title VII suit who can rely on statistical proof, 91
the tenant is unlikely to have access to past histories or statistical comparisons to support his prima facie case. Thus the tenant may be hardpressed to find additional evidence. Once one tenant's eviction is upheld because the 'landlord presented a modicum of unrefuted evidence,
other tenants may 'be reluctant to cooperate with housing officials.
D.

The Problem of Mixed Motives

Underlying the requirement that the tenant rebut proof of business justification is the assumption that the justification was the sole
motivation of the eviction. But as the Supreme Court has noted,
"[I]n human experience, such situations present a complex of motives. ''9 2 Improper and proper reasons may underlie a landlord's action
in varying degree. A primary desire -to retaliate may coexist with the
desire to increase profits; an overwhelmingly legitimate motive may be
tinged with elements of spite. When should the presence of an improper motive warrant a finding of retaliatory eviction?" s
No answer could be more favorable to landlords than that given
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dick-hut v. Norton, which was that
the tenant must prove the landlord acted for the sole purpose of retaliation. The landlord is rare whose lawyer cannot unearth some evidence of a proper motive, and the factfinder would have to disregard
this evidence completely to hold for -the tenant. Seldom would a de90. Riley v. Willette, [1968-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
12,263,
at 12,516 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1970); PMS Realty Co. v. Guarino, 126 N.J. Super. 134,
312 A.2d 398 (Dist. Ct. 1973); Alexander Hamilton Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley,
107 N.J. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7 (Dist. Ct. 1969); Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc. 2d
384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Binghamton City Ct. 1973).
91.
92.

Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
NIRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963).

93. Many statutes and decisions, perhaps -the majority, do not specify -what weight
an improper motive must play to find a retaliatory eviction. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
80, § 71 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 2A (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42-10.10, -. 12 (Supp. 1974); N.Y.

UNCONSOL.

LAws § 8590 (McKinney Supp.

1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN'. §§ 34-20-10 (1969); Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972).
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fense of retaliation be sustained. Consequently, tenants would fear to
assert their rights. The "sole purpose" approach thus eviscerates the
doctrine of retaliatory eviction.
The answer most favorable to tenants is that retaliation should be
found whenever an improper reason played any role in -motivating the
landlord. The almost complete immunity this approach provides tenants from retaliation would encourage them to exercise their rights and
to cooperate with housing authorities. But it would also give tenants
virtual immunity from their own misconduct, for a sympathetic jury
could always find on the basis of the tenant's prima facie case that the
landlord was partially motivated by a desire to retaliate.
The problem of competing motives is often encountered in labor
law. In theory, an employer acts illegally when motivated in whole
or in part by an improper motive. 4 In practice, however, courts reviewing NLRB decisions frequently reverse findings of improper
motive when business justifications are strong and evidence of improper motive rests on weak inferences. 9 5 Thus, as a practical matter,
improper motive must play a substantial role in the employer's decision.
This substantial motivation test, at first glance, seems an attractive
compromise. But unlike labor cases, which arise in an administrative
context, retaliatory eviction claims will usually be tried to a jury. Over
the years, an administrative agency can develop a working understanding of what the appellate courts will consider a substantial motivation,
but the term gives little
guidance to a jury. For similar reasons, the
"overriding reason"9" and "dominant purpose"9 7 tests suggested by
some courts and legislatures should be rejected. These tests require
the jury to engage in the highly metaphorical task of weighing motives.
A test that encouraged the jury to make a more factual inquiry would
be preferrable.
The best test appears to be the "but for" test of tort law. Under
this test, the jury asks, "Would the tenant have been evicted if he had
not engaged in a protected activity?" The rationale for adopting this
test is that the tenant who would not have been molested if he had
94. NLRB v. Barberton Plastics Prods. Inc., 354 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 79 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Symons Mfg.

Co., 328 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1964).

A number of courts, however, have indicated that

inquiry must be directed to the employer's "predominate motive." A.P. Green Fire
Brick Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc.,
293 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1961).
In NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 288 (1965), the Court used, in passing, the
phrase "primarily motivated." Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
46 (1937) ("true purpose").

95. E.g., Wellington Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579 (4th
Cir. 1964), denying enforcement to 141 N.L.R.B. 819 (1963).
96. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West. Supp. 1973). Maine uses "primary purpose."
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1974).
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not engaged in a protected activity deserves to be protected. This test
encourages the free reporting of housing code complaints, but also
permits the landlord to rid himself of a destructive tenant even if partly
motivated by retaliation. The test is easy for a jury to understand and
apply. Finally, it should allow trial and appellate judges to exercise
some control over juries that may be overly sympathetic to tenants.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the last decade, courts and legislatures have begun to protect
tenants who attack substandard housing conditions from retaliation by
landlords. If a landlord attempts to evict or increase the rent of a tenant who has engaged in a protected activity such as reporting a housing code violation, the tenant can raise the defense of retaliatory eviction. In virtually all jurisdictions, an essential part of this defense is
proof that the landlord's motive was retaliation. Admittedly, proving
motive can pose serious problems for the tenant. The Model Code
attempts to avoid these problems by eliminating the element of motive;
under the Model Code, a tenant cannot be evicted during a fixed period of time after he engages in protected activity. But the period of
time is so short, and the rule contains so many exceptions, that the tenant is really unprotected from retaliation by a determined landlord.
Underlying the Model Code is the assumption that the problem
of proving motive is insurmountable. The experience of courts dealing with labor statutes such as the NLRA and title VII indicates, however, that the problem of proving motive can be solved. Although the
specialized doctrines evolved in labor law cannot be directly adapted
to landlord-tenant law, they can offer valuable guidance.
In particular, the labor cases demonstrate the value of presumptions in dealing with the problem of proving motive. A tenant who
can show that the landlord raised his rent or attempted to evict him
soon after he engaged in protected activities, should be considered to
have raised a presumption of improper motive. Unless the landlord introduces rebuttal evidence, the tenant should be entitled to a
directed verdict. On the other hand, if the landlord introduces credible rebuttal evidence, by making either a showing of business justification or a sworn denial that he had a retaliatory motive, the case should
go to the jury. The tenant should not be required to counter the rebuttal evidence with further proof of retaliatory motive. The question
the jury must answer is whether the landlord would have acted as he
did if the tenant had not engaged in protected activities.
This system of allocating the burden of proof is designed to protect tenants from retaliatory eviction without unduly restricting the
landlord's ability to deal with his tenants. Placing too heavy a burden
of proof on the tenant might undermine the policies underlying the
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doctrine of retaliatory eviction; placing too heavy a burden on the landlord might leave him at the mercy of any tenant who engaged in protected activity. Rather than attempting to reconcile the competing interests of the landlord and tenant by establishing a detailed regulatory
scheme, this system of presumptions is intended to allow an intelligent
case-by-case resolution of the conflict.
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